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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Respondent and Appellee Pine Meadow Ranch Home Owners Association (the
"Association") agrees with the statement of jurisdiction contained in the brief filed by
Petitioner and Appellant Forest Meadow Ranch Property Owners Association, LLC ("Forest
Meadow").
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
Issue No. 1: Whether Forest Meadow has standing to challenge the 1971 CC&Rs and
the 1980 Lien Notice since it took title to Lot 105 A with both constructive and actual notice
of these recorded instruments?
Issue No. 2: Whether Forest Meadow has overcome the presumptions contained in
Utah Code Ann. § 57-4a-4, i.e., that Deseret Diversified was an owner of the property that
became Lot 105 A at the time the CC&Rs were recorded and duly executed by the same?
Issue No. 3: Whether Utah has adopted the Doctrine of Uniformity as it relates to
CC&Rs and whether, specifically, it applies to the 1971 CC&Rs?
Issue No. 4: Whether the 1980 Lien Notice, which merely republishes prior
encumbrances, is a wrongful lien as against a lot already burdened by such encumbrances?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because this matter is before the Court of Appeals on appeal from entry of Summary
Judgment by the district court on each of the above issues presented, the Court of Appeals
grants the district court's legal conclusions no deference, reviewing them for correctness.
Arnold Industries, Inc. v. Love, 63 P.3d 721,725 (Utah 2002) (citations omitted).
1

PRESERVATION OF ISSUES IN THE TRIAL COURT
Issue No. 1: SeeR. 00230-33.
Issue No. 2: See R. 00233-37.
Issue No. 3: See R. 00468-73.
Issue No. 4: See 0077-88A; 00466-68.
DETERMINATIVE LEGAL PROVISIONS
Issue No. 1: Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-102 (2000); Utah Code Ann. § 57-4a-2 (2000);
Swenson v. Erickson, 998 P.2d 807 (Utah 2000); 20 Am. Jur. 2D Covenants §§
266-67 (1995); Ault v. Holden, 44 P.3d 781 (Utah 2002); Arnold Industries,
Inc., v. Love, 63 P.3d 721 (Utah 2002); 23 Am. Jur. 2D Deeds § 272 (2004).
Issue No. 2: Utah Code Ann. § 57-4a-4 (2000); Jacobs v. Hafen, 875 P.2d 559 (Utah App.
1994); Capital Assets Financial Services v. Maxwell, 994 P.2d 201 (Utah
2000); TWN, Inc., v. Michel, 66 P.3d 1031 (Utah App. 2003); Flying Diamond
Oil Corporation v. Newton Sheep Company, 776 P.2d 618 (Utah 1989).
Issue No. 3: 20 Am. Jur. 2D Covenants § 160 (1995).
Issue No. 4: Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-9-1, et seq. (2000).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE1
Appellant Forest Meadow2 filed this expensive lawsuit in an effort to avoid an annual
assessment of $175 by the Association authorized by thirty-year-old Covenants, Conditions
1

The Association does not agree with Forest Meadow's Statement of the Case,
Appellant's Brief ("App. Br.") at 17-21, in part because Forest Meadow failed to separately
set forth a statement of facts as required by Rule 24(a)(7) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure. Therefore, pursuant to Rule 24(b)( 1), the Association sets forth its own Statement
of the Case and Statement of Facts.
2

Forest Meadow, though confusingly denominated as an association of property
owners, is the owner of a single lot in the Forest Meadow Plat D Subdivision.
2

and Restrictions for the Forest Meadow Subdivisions ("CC&Rs") recorded in Summit
County in 1971 and 1973. Specifically, this appeal seeks to reverse the summary judgment
entered by the Hon. Judge Bruce C. Lubeck effectively validating the CC&Rs recorded over
thirty years ago in Summit County. (R. 0493-97). Forest Meadow, the owner of Lot 105 A
in the Forest Meadow Subdivision, Plat D, recognizes that Deseret Diversified Development,
recorded the CC&Rs in 1971 "to provide for a mandatory home owners' association with
power to make assessments and impose liens" against a large tract of real property in Summit
County, Utah. (R. 0023-26). Forest Meadow tries now to avoid its obligations despite the
uncontroverted fact that it admittedly took title to Lot 105A, Plat D, Forest Meadow Ranch
Subdivision ("Lot 105A") with both constructive and actual notice of the CC&Rs. (R.
00167-68).3
The Association operates as the homeowners' association for approximately 800 lots,
homes and cabins in the Pine Meadow Ranch and Forest Meadow Ranch Subdivisions
located north of Silver Creek Junction in Summit County. (R. 00245). Principal access to
the Pine Meadow Ranch area is from Silver Creek Canyon between Silver Creek Junction
and Wanship along Interstate 80, reached from Tollgate Canyon. The ranch area is to the
north and west of Interstate 80. The lots in the Pine Meadow Rand and Forest Meadow

3

The Association respectfully suggest that the court may consider this a
frivolous appeal under Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure since Forest
Meadow acquired title to its lot with actual notice of the CC&Rs and because the expensive
approach Forest Meadow has taken in this litigation is wholly out of proportion to the amount
of controversy at issue, i.e., a $175 annual assessment.
3

Ranch subdivisions are adjacent to each other and they share a common roadway, water
system and homeowners' association. (R. 00244).
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Brent Jensen and his companies, including Deseret
Diversified Development ("Deseret Diversified"), had acquired interests in and began
development of a large parcel of real property that would become the Pine Meadow Ranch
and Forest Meadow Ranch subdivisions. (R. 00244).4 In August 1972, Deseret Diversified
and Security Title Company ("Security Title"), together as "owners," recorded a plat, Forest
Meadow Ranch Plat D, subdividing what is now known, in part, as the Forest Meadow
Ranch subdivision. (R. 00179). Prior to the recording of the subdivision plat, in July 1971,
Deseret Diversified had recorded a set of CC&Rs which encumbered portions of the Forest
Meadow Ranch area and, specifically, much of what would subsequently become the lot
owned by Forest Meadow. (R. 00174-77). In August 1971, promptly upon discovering a
typographical error in the property description in the CC&Rs, the CC&Rs were corrected and
the CC&Rs re-recorded (the "1971 CC&Rs") in order to eliminate confusion. (R. 00475-78).
Jensen and his companies were also developing the Pine Meadow Ranch subdivisions around
this same time period and recorded various sets of CC&Rs for Pine Meadow as well. (R.
00181-90).

4

See Leo M. Bertanole, Inc. v. Pine Meadow Ranches, 639 P.2d 211,212 (Utah
1981) (noting a general description of the development area and Brent Jensen's
involvement).
4

In May 1978, the Forest Meadow Ranch Landowners Association5, which had acted
as the owners' association for the Forest Meadow Ranch subdivisions, merged with the
Association. (R. 00244). In 1980, to confirm public notice of the various sets of CC&Rs
recorded against various Pine Meadow and Forest Meadow subdivisions, the Association
republished those CC&Rs in the form of a "Notice of Lien" ("1980 Lien Notice"). (R.
00247). The 1980 Lien Notice did not change or alter any of the referenced the CC&Rs
(including the 1971 CC&Rs) but merely clarified the applicability of the CC&Rs to the
various Forest Meadow and Pine Meadow areas that were, post-merger, served by the
Association. (R. 00247).
For many years, the Pine Meadow and Forest Meadow subdivisions were served by
a Special Service District established by Summit County. During this time, the Association
had continued to act on behalf of its members in the Forest Meadow Ranch and Pine
Meadow Ranch areas. In 2003, the Association had an annual budget of approximately
$140,000. (R. 00246). The source of this budget is the modest $175 annual assessment on
the property owners in the area subject to various CC&Rs.6 The subdivision plats and the
CC&Rs recorded against the 800 separate properties within the Association have been the

5

This Association should not in anyway be confused with the Appellant in this
action. They are distinct unrelated entities.
6

While the CC&Rs vary somewhat throughout the subdivisions within the
Association, the level of assessment is uniform for all lots. The Association began making
direct assessments to its members when Summit County dissolved the Special Service
District in 1999 and transferred many of its responsibilities to the Association. (R. 00246).
5

foundation of hundreds, if not thousands, of deeds and other conveyances over the years
since their creation. (R. 00246).
In December 1999, Forest Meadow acquired Lot 105 A of the Forest Meadow Ranch
Subdivision Plat D ("Lot 105A"). (R. 000136). Forest Meadow took title of Lot 105A
expressly "subject to easements, restrictions and right of way currently of record, and general
property taxes for the year 1998 and thereafter." (R. 00206). Compellingly, Forest Meadow
acknowledges that it took title of Lot 105 A with both constructive and actual notice of the
1971 CC&Rs and the 1980 Lien Notice. (R. 00167). However, Forest Meadow has never
paid its annual $175 assessment, despite voting at Association meetings and enjoying the
roadway improvements and other benefits provided by the Association.
Shortly after taking title in late December 1999, Forest Meadow filed a petition to
nullify the 1980 Lien Notice as a wrongful lien pursuant to the Summary Procedures of
Utah's Wrongful Lien Statute, Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-9-1, et seq. (R. 0001-0007). Forest
Meadow did not initially seek to invalidate the 1971 CC&Rs. Subsequently, after its effort
under the Summary Procedures was rejected by the district court, Forest Meadow filed an
amended Petition for Summary Relief to Nullify Wrongful Lien seeking an order from the
district court that the 1980 Lien Notice was a "wrongful lien" and a declaration that the 1971
CC&Rs were invalid. As a result, Forest Meadow argued, it should not be required to pay
any assessments. (R. 0102-04). In late 2003, the parties filed cross motions for summary
judgment urging the court to resolve these issues as a matter of law. (R. 00215-16; 217-19).

6

The district court listened to extensive argument and, in March 2004, issued its Ruling and
Order denying Forest Meadow's motion for summary judgment and granting the
Association's cross motion for summary judgment. (R. 00366-82).7 Not satisfied, Forest
Meadow filed a "Second" motion for summary judgment that was also denied by the trial
court. (R. 00490-92).
In April 2003, the district court entered judgment in favor of the Association and
against Forest Meadow. (R. 00493-97). The judgment decreed (1) that the 1971 CC&Rs
were properly filed and properly encumber Lot 105 A; (2) that the burdens and benefits of the
1971 CC&Rs run with the land and have done so for thirty years and, as a result, Forest
Meadow's challenge to the 1971 CC&Rs is untimely; (3) that since Forest Meadow bought
its lot with notice of the 1971 CC&Rs and acquired title subject to them, it would be
inequitable for Forest Meadow not to comply with them; and (4) that the 1971 CC&Rs and
the 1980 Lien Notice are not wrongful liens against Forest Meadow's property. (R. 0049397). Forest Meadow now appeals this judgment.

7

The court ruled consistently in a companion case Paul Howard Peters vs. Pine
Meadow Ranch Home Association (also known as Pine Meadow Ranch Home Owners
Association and as Pine Meadow Ranch Association), the appeal of which is also pending
in this court, Appellate Case No. 20040396-CA.
7

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Parties
1.

The Association was established August 14, 1973, by Brent Jensen and

Vincent B. Tolmann to act as the owners' association for the Pine Meadow Subdivisions
located in Summit County, Utah. (R. 00244).
2.

Forest Meadow is a Utah limited liability company established in December

1999 by Axel Grabowski. (R. 0160-61). Paul Howard Peters was the President and Chief
Executive Officer of Forest Meadow at the time Forest Meadow filed this action. (R. 000910).
Chain of Ownership of Lot 105 A
3.

Forest Meadow is the beneficial owner of Lot 105 A, Plat D, Forest Meadow

Subdivision, by a 1999 Quit Claim Deed from Axel Grabowski recorded by the Summit
County Recorder's Office (R. 0134).
4.

Forest Meadow's chain of title for Lot 105 A runs as follows:
a.

Deed from F.E. Bates and Mae P. Bates to Security Title Company,

dated October 14,1965, recorded October 18,1965 asentrynumber 101972, Book M3, Page
188. (R. 0134) This deed conveys the larger tract of property out of which Lot 105 A was
subsequently created. (R. 0135)
b.

Plat "D" for the Forest Meadow Ranch recorded by Deseret Diversified

Development Inc., absent Jensen Company, and Security Title Co., trustee, as "owners" on

8

August 9, 1972, as entry number 116550. (R. 0135) Lot 105-D of the Forest Meadow
Ranch was created by the recordation of this Plat. (R. 0135).
c.

Deed to Lot 105-D from Security Title Company to Jensen Investment

(another Brent Jensen company) dated January 15,1975, recorded January 16,1975, as entry
number 125699, book M63e, Page 432. (R. 0135). Jensen Investment took title expressly
subject to "easements, restrictions, reservations and rights of way appearing of record or
enforceable in law and equity and taxes for the year 1975 and thereafter." (R. 0192).
d.

Quitclaim Deed to the East Half of Lot 105-D from Jensen Investment

Clifton Emmet Clark and Sharon M. Clark, dated January 16, 1975, recorded January 16,
1975, as entry number 125700, Book 63, page 433. (R. 0135).
e.

Warranty Deed to the East Half of Lot 105-D from Jensen Investment

to Clifton Emmet Clark and Sharon M. Clark dated January 16, 1975, recorded January 16,
1975, as entry number 125701, Book M63 page 434. (R. 0135).
f.

Quit Claim Deed to the East Half of Lot 105-D from Clifton Emmet

Clark and Sharon M. Clark to Jensen Investment dated July 16, 1975, recorded July 23,
1975, as entry number 127540, Book M68, page 671. (R. 0135-36).
g.

Warranty deed to the portion of Lot 105-D (which now becomes Lot

105A today) from Jensen Investment to Harold E. Waldhouse and Maylene C. Waldhouse,
dated July 22,1975, recorded July 23,1975, as entry number 127541, Book M68, Page 672.
(R.0136).

9

h.

Warranty Deed to Lot 105A from Harold E. Waldhouse and Maylene

C. Waldhouse to Shelley J. Oakason, reserving oil, gas, and mineral rights, dated December
12, 1988, recorded December 13,1988, as entry number 301081, Book 503, Page 524. (R.
0136). Oakason took the property expressly subject "to easements, restrictions, reservations.
and rights of way appearing of record or enforceable in law and equity and taxes and/or
assessments for the year 1989 and thereafter." (R. 00203, emphasis added).
i.

Warranty Deed to Lot 105A from Shelley J. Liftos who had acquired

title as Shelley J. Oakason to Axel Grabowski dated October 15,1998, recorded October 29,
1998, as entry number 00521339, Book 01196, Page 00147. (R. 0136). Here, again,
Grabowski took title to the property "subject to easements, restrictions and right of way
currently of record, and general property taxes for the year 1998 and thereafter." (R. 00205,
emphasis added).
j.

Quitclaim Deed to Lot 105A from Axel Grabowski to a company he

established, Forest Meadow Ranch Property Owners Association, dated December 9,1999,
recorded December 10,1999, as entry number 00554966, Book 01299, Pages 00445-00446.
(R. 0136). Forest Meadow also acquired title to the property expressly "subject to easements,
restrictions and right of way currently of record, and general property taxes for the year 1998
and thereafter." (R. 00207-08, emphasis added).
5.

The recordation of the CC&Rs imports constructive notice of their contents.

See Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-3-102, 574a-2 (2000). In addition, Forest Meadow had actual

10

notice of the plat and CC&Rs. (R. 00167). ("Before Petitioner [Forest Meadow] acquired
Lot 105A-D, I was aware of the 1971 CC&R's [sic], the 1973 CC&R's [sic], and the 1980
Notice of Lien

I knew that Petitioner [Forest Meadow] would not acquire the Lot 105A-

D free and clear of the 1971 CC&Rs [sic] or the 1989 [sic] Notice of Lien....") (Affidavit
of Paul Howard Peters, President and CEO of Forest Meadow).
Formation of the Pine Meadow Ranch and Forest Meadow Ranch Subdivisions and
Owners' Associations
6.

Brent Jensen and his companies, including Deseret Diversified were the

developers of the Pine Meadow and Forest Meadow subdivisions. (R. 00244).
7.

Over twenty years ago, the Utah Supreme Court received that Brent Jensen and

his companies were the developers of the Pine Meadow and Forest Meadow subdivisions.
SeeLeoM. Bertanole, Inc. v. Pine Meadow Ranches, 639P.2d211,212 (Utah 1981) (noting
that in 1970 "Brent Jensen, a defendant, bought acreage north of Tollgate Canyon for
development purposes . . . . By January 1, 1975, 380 mountain lots had been sold in areas
served by Tollgate Road, including Jensen's Forest Meadow Ranch and Pine Meadow Ranch
subdivisions").
8.

OnMarch 18,1971, Deseret Diversified was incorporated in Utah. (R. 00294).

9.

The Forest Meadow Ranch Plat D ("Plat D"), which was recorded with the

Summit County Recorder on August 9, 1972, plainly states that it was recorded by the
"owners" of the property, Deseret Diversified and Security Title Company, Trustee. (R.
00179).
11

10.

Plat D was then signed by the beneficial owner, Deseret Diversified (by W.

Brent Jensen, President, and Lee Ann Hunter, Secretary) and by Security Title Company as
Trustee. (R. 0179). Each party's signature on the plat implicitly confirmed the ownership
status of the other.
11.

Plat D confirms that it was "recorded and filed at the request of Deseret

Diversified Development Corp." (R. 00179).
12.

The Owners' Declaration of "Plat D" indicates, in relevant part:
"Know all men by these presents that we, the four undersigned
owners of the above described tract of land, having caused the
same to be subdivided into lots & streets hereafter to be known
as: FOREST MEADOW RANCH, PLAT "D" do hereby declare
for perpetual use of the public all parcels of land shown on this
plat as intended for public use."

(R. 0179). While no portion of the plat appears to have been intended for public (as opposed
to community) use, this Declaration identifies the "owners" of the developed lands. Id.
13.

The Subdivider's Note, also contained on the recorded Plat D, also provides,

"The recording of this plat shall not constitute a dedication of roads and streets or rights of
way to public use. It is intended that all streets shown hereon shall remain the property of
the subdivider, Deseret Diversified Development, Inc.- and shall be completely maintained
by said owners." (R. 0179). Here, Deseret Diversified was identified as the subdivider of
the land as well as an owner. Id.
14.

The Surveyor's Certificate on Plat D provides that "I, Lynn D. Gottfredsen, do

hereby certify... that I have, by authority of the owners, subdivided the tract of land shown
12

on this plat & described below into lots & Streets (private roads), to be hereafter known as
FOREST MEADOW RANCH, PLAT 'D.'" (R. 0179, emphasis added).
15.

The Forest Meadow Ranch Landowners Association was initially formed as

the owners' association for the Forest Meadow subdivisions, including Plat D. (R. 00244).
16.

The Pine Meadow and Forest Meadow subdivisions have always shared a

common water and roadway system and, on May 30, 1978, the Forest Meadow Ranch
Landowners Association was merged into the Pine Meadow Association by shareholder vote.
(R. 00244).
17.

Since the merger in 1978, the Association has operated as the homeowners'

association for all of the 800 plus lots, homes and cabins in the Pine Meadow and Forest
Meadow subdivisions. (R. 00245).
18.

The various subdivision plats and the CC&Rs recorded against the properties

within the Association boundaries have been the basis for foundation of hundreds, if not
thousands, of deeds and other conveyances of the 800 lots over the past thirty years. (R.
00245).
19.

Lot ownership has been the basis for membership in the Association, including

assessments and notice of and the right to vote at the Association's annual meetings. (R.
00245).
20.

Prior to the dissolution of the Special Service District for Summit County

referred to below, the Association operated based on funds collected by that District. Since

13

dissolution of the District, the Association has assessed all lots on a uniform basis to pay for
its operations. (R. 00245).
21.

One of the primary expenses and responsibilities of the Association is to own,

maintain and insure the extensive road system in the Pine Meadow and Forest Meadow
Ranches areas for the benefit of all of the Association's members and their invitees. (R.
00245). Access to lots within the Association's boundary, including Lot 105A, can only be
had through the Association's roadways.
22.

The Association also owns, maintains, and insures a substantial amount of open

space for the benefit of its members. (R. 00245).
Creation and Dissolution of the Special Service District
23.

In October 1985, the Summit County Commission determined to establish the

Pine Meadow Special Service District (the "SSD") for the provision of water service, the
maintenance of roadways, and other services in the Pine Meadow areas for the benefit of the
lot and home owners, including the owners of Lot 105 A. (R. 00245-46).
24.

The predecessor owners of Lot 105A paid taxes to and received benefits from

the SSD. (R. 00246).
25.

The SSD was dissolved by vote of the Summit County Commission in the

spring of 2000. (R. 00246).
26.

The commission, sitting as the governing board for the SSD, conveyed tracts

of open space to the Association and executed a "Deed of Easement" conveying to the
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Association, for the benefit and use of its members, and easement for the operation and
maintenance of roads in the Pine Meadow and Forest Meadow subdivisions. (R. 00246). The
water rights and delivery system owned by the SSD were conveyed to a separate company
owned by all association members.
Assessment of the Association's Members Pursuant to the CC&Rs
27.

On July 22, 1971, Deseret Diversified recorded a set of CC&Rs entitled

"Reservations and Restrictive Covenants, Forest Meadow Ranch," dated July 8, 1971, as
entry No. 113593, Book No. M32, Pages 251-254 in the office of the County Recorder of
Summit County. (R. 0023-26).
28.

These CC&Rs were signed by Deseret Diversified Development, a Utah

Corporation by W. Brent Jensen, its president. (R. 0023-26). They plainly recite that the
CC&Rs are established by Deseret Diversified "the owner of the foregoing described
premises . . . . " (emphasis added).
29.

On August 19, 1971, Deseret Diversified promptly re-recorded the original

CC&Rs (the "1971 CC&Rs") as Entry No. 113788, Book No. M32, Pages 590-93 in the of
the office of the County Recorder of Summit County, to correct an obvious but incorrect
description of the property. (R. 00475-478). The re-recorded 1971 CC&Rs clearly corrected
the legal description from "Township 1 South" to "Township 1 North." The original
recording information is reflected along with the new recording information. The rerecorded 1971 CC&Rs plainly declare Deseret Diversified was the owner of the land
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described therein. Much of the property that later became the Forest Meadow Subdivision
Plat D is contained in that description. (R. 00475-78).
30.

On September 28, 1973, Brent Jensen on behalf of Pine Meadow Ranch

recorded a "Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions" by "Pine Meadow
Ranch, Inc." (the "Pine Meadow CC&Rs") as Entry No. 120967, Book No. M50, Pages 521530. (R. 0000181-90).
31.

In furtherance of its activities, the Association has assessed its members for

payment of its actions on their behalf since the dissolution of the SSD. (R. 00246).
32.

The Association has collected from its members, and spent for their benefit

in the Pine Meadow area, hundreds of thousands of dollars. (R. 00246).
33.

In 2003, the Association had an annual budget of approximately $ 140,000. (R.

00246).
34.

Should the Association lose its ability to assess all of its members to maintain

the commonly owned property, maintain its extensive road system and fund its other
activities, its purposes would be frustrated and it would be unable to secure access, maintain
and insure its properties, or enforce its other restrictive covenants on behalf of its members.
(R. 00246-47).
35.

To confirm public notice of the various sets of CC&Rs recorded against

various Pine Meadow and Forest Meadow subdivisions, the Association republished those
CC&Rs in the form of the 1980 Lien Notice recorded on July 25,1980 as Entry No. 168800
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in Book 163 at Page 152 of the records of the Summit County Recorder, and therein gave
notice of an address at which confirmation of payments of any assessments could be
obtained. (R. 00247).
36.

In response to questions raised in part as a result of this lawsuit, on April 3,

2003, the Association recorded the Clarification of Notice of Lien as Entry No. 653634 in
Book 1523 at Page 1809, confirming that the 1980 Lien Notice was intended merely to
republish the existing CC&Rs and other encumbrances of record and did not to create any
new charge or encumbrance on any property. (R. 00247).
3 7.

Forest Meadow took title of Lot 105 A with actual notice of the 1971 CC&Rs

and the 1980 Lien Notice. (R. 00167-68). ("Before Petitioner [Forest Meadow] acquired
Lot 105A-D, I was aware of the 1971 CC&R's [sic], the 1973 CC&R's [sic], and the 1980
Notice of Lien — I knew that Petitioner [Forest Meadow] would not acquire the Lot 105AD free and clear of the 1971 CC&Rs [sic] or the 19809 [sic] Notice of Lien

").

Procedural History
38.

On March 6, 2000, Forest Meadow filed a petition to nullify the 1980 Lien

Notice as a wrongful lien pursuant to the Summary Procedures provided in Utah's Wrongful
Lien Statute, Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-9-1, etseq. (R. 0001-07).
39.

On May 17, 2000, having been denied summary relief, Forest Meadow filed

an amended Petition for Summary Relief to Nullify Wrongful Lien seeking an order from the
district court declaring that the 1980 Lien Notice was a "wrongful lien" and a further
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declaration that the 1971 CC&Rs and the 1973 Pine Meadow CC&Rs were void, thereby
excusing Forest Meadow from paying any assessments. (R. 0102-04). Forest Meadow
accurately alleges that the 1971 CC&Rs burdened its property located in Township 1 North,
as confirmed by the corrected and re-recorded 1971 CC&Rs. (R. 0001-0007). Forest
Meadow had no confusion about which lands were burdened by the re-recorded CC&Rs.
40.

On October 14,2003, Forest Meadow filed its motion for summary judgment.

(R. 00215-16).
41.

On December 10, 2003, the Association filed its cross motion for summary

judgment and its opposition to Forest Meadow's motion for summary judgment. (R. 00217-

m42.

On March 22,2004, after extensive argument, the district court, the Hon. Judge

Bruce C. Lubeck, District Court Judge, issued its Ruling and Order denying Forest
Meadow's motion for summary judgment and granting the Association's cross motion for
summary judgment. (R. 00366-82).
43.

On April 5, 2004, Forest Meadow filed a "Second" motion for summary

judgment, (R. 0383-4), which was opposed by the Association on April 17,2004. (R. 046278).
44.

On April 29,2004, Judge Lubeck issued his Ruling and Order denying Forest

Meadow's Second motion for summary judgment. (R. 00490-92).
45.

On April 29, 2004, Judge Lubeck thereupon entered judgment that:
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1.
Deseret Diversified Development, a Utah corporation, an
owner and subdivider of the land that includes the lot [105 A]
now owned by [Forest Meadow], properly encumbered that lot
and others in its development with the 1971 Reservation and
Restrictive Covenants Forest Meadow Ranch [1971 CC&Rs].
2.
The burdens and benefits of the 1971 CC&Rs run with
the land and have done so for the past thirty years. [Forest
Meadow's] challenge to the 1971 CC&Rs is untimely.
3.
[Forest Meadow] bought its lot with notice of the 1971
CC&Rs and acquired its title subject to them. [Forest Meadow]
enjoys the benefits of the CC&Rs and it would be inequitable
for [Forest Meadow] not to comply with them.
4.
The 1971 CC&Rs, the 1980 [Lien Notice] and the 2003
Clarification of Notice of Lien are not wrongful liens against
[Forest Meadow's] property.
5.
Judgment is hereby entered in favor of [the Association]
and against [Forest Meadow]. The Petition is dismissed, with
prejudice, the parties to bear their own costs and attorney's fees.
(R. 0493-97).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
By the language of its own deed, Forest Meadow took title to Lot 105 A subject to
easements, restrictions and rights of way appearing of record. Forest Meadow did not have
to rely on constructive notice of those restrictions, however, because it admits it had actual
notice of the 1971 CC&Rs and the 1980 Lien Notice before it chose to take title. CC&Rs
are in essence contracts established by a prior owner that encumber property for the burden
and benefit of subsequent purchasers. Forest Meadow became a party to this contract at the
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time it purchased Lot 105 A. As a matter of law, the CC&Rs cannot be considered adverse
to Forest Meadow's interest in Lot 105 A since it acquired title expressly subject to and with
actual knowledge of the 1971 CC&Rs. Invalidating the 1971 CC&Rs would overturn thirty
years of the Association's authority and action on behalf of its members, and the Association
would effectively lose its ability to assess its members to maintain the commonly owned
property, maintain the road and water systems, and fund its other activities. If the CC&Rs
are invalidated, the developer's purpose in establishing a community, and setting up an
association to govern it, would be frustrated.
Forest Meadow ignores both history and practicality, setting up a series of hypertechnical challenges to over-turn these CC&Rs, which were properly filed and have since
acquired decades of dignity. It has launched an expensive challenge in an effort to avoid
minor, annual assessments. Forest Meadow argues, for example, that the 1971 CC&Rs are
invalid because Deseret Diversified, in 1971, corrected a typographical error in the property
description. Forest Meadow ignores the fact that the re-recorded CC&Rs contained the
specific notations of the prior filing, and that the prior filing, mere weeks before, constituted
the basis for the re-filing. The document is in writing and bears the signature of its owner.
It complies with Utah's Statutes of Fraud. There is simply no law or rule in Utah that
requires a recordable document to be re-executed to fix a scrivener's error, so long as it
accurately sets forth the author's intent. Forest Meadow offered no indicia of fraud or
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intervention by a third-party between thefilingof the two instruments, and no evidence was
offered to suggest that the re-recorded CC&Rs are not reflective of the author's intent.
While Forest Meadow's arguments fail as a matter of law, equity also mandates that
Forest Meadow cannot invalidate the CC&Rs and reverse thirty years of reliance on them by
hundreds of property owners and the Association. Read correctly, Forest Meadow's effort
to invalidate the 1971 CC&Rs elevates a number of technical arguments over their
compelling and logical substance. The result it urges is inconsistent with the law and equity.
Section 57-4a-4(l)(j) of the Utah Code provides a series of clear presumptions,
including a presumption that "recitals and other statements of fact in a [recorded] document
. . . are true." Utah Code Ann. § 57-4a-4(l)(j) (2003 Supp.).8 The recorded Plats, CC&Rs
and other contemporaneous documents filed in the 1970s both state that Deseret Diversified
was a beneficial owner of the property that became Lot 105 A at the time the CC&Rs were
filed and recorded.

Forest Meadow ignores this argument and offered no evidence to

overcome this presumption. As an owner of the property, Deseret Diversified was clearly
authorized to record the 1971 CC&Rs.9
8

Section 57-4a-4 provides in relevant part: "(i) A recorded document creates the
following presumptions regarding title to the real property affected:... 0) recitals and other
statements of fact in a document, including without limitation recitals concerning mergers
or name changes of organizations, are true." Utah Code Ann. § 57-4a-4 (2000).
9

The illogic of Forest Meadow's argument is also demonstrated by the fact that
the same Deseret Diversified that recorded and corrected the CC&Rs also subdivided the lots
and recorded the plat. If it lacked an interest sufficient to support the CC&Rs, it could not
have created Lot 105A. In other words, if Forest Meadow proves that the CC&Rs are
invalid, it also proves that Lot 105A was improperly subdivided. Forest Meadow would then
lack standing to challenge the Association.
21

The doctrine of descriptio personae does not offer Forest Meadow any relief or
invalidate the 1971 CC&Rs. This Court has noted that "the unexplained use of the word
'trustee' on a real property deed does not, absent other circumstances suggest the creation
or existence of a trust, create a trust or implicate only a trust interest." TWN, Inc., v. Michel,
66 P.3d 1031,1034 (Utah App. 2003) (emphasis added). Thus, a party, like the Association
"may resort to extrinsic evidence to show that a trust was, in fact, intended." Id. Unlike the
circumstances of that case, there are no competing claims of title, and the extrinsic evidence
(including the joinder of Security Title in Plat D) clearly demonstrates that Security Title held
the property in trust for the interests represented by Deseret Diversified.
The 1971 CC&Rs are valid since Deseret Diversified was an owner of the property
at the time the CC&Rs were filed. Deseret Diversified recorded the 1971 CC&Rs as the
beneficial owner of the property. The requirements of privity are satisfied. Forest Meadow's
successors in interest received title from Security Title as Trustee for Deseret Diversified.
The CC&Rs clearly run with the land and Forest Meadow took title with actual notice of the
CC&Rs.
Forest Meadow also argues the "Utah doctrine of uniformity" but provides no
authority for that proposition. Utah has never adopted it. Forest Meadow argues that if the
doctrine of uniformity as described in Am. Jur. 2D applies, the CC&Rs violate this doctrine
since they do not apply to all of the Forest Meadow Ranch property owners. However,
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Forest Meadow misapplies the doctrine. In fact, their application is completely uniform to
all those burdened by the 1971 CC&Rs.
Finally, the 1980 Lien Notice is not a wrongful lien pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§§ 38-9-1, et seq. (2000). Since Forest Meadow was not an owner of "real property" at the
time the CC&Rs were recorded, it does not have standing to invalidate the lien. As noted,
Forest Meadow took ownership expressly subject to the CC&Rs and the resulting lien.
Moreover, the 1980 Lien Notice does not create any new obligation outside of the 1971
CC&Rs. Equity requires that Forest Meadow, like its neighbors, ought to be bound by the
CC&Rs as it had notice of them at the time it took title and has enjoyed the fruits of such
restrictions. Therefore, the lien properly established by the CC&Rs and republished by the
1980 Lien Notice is simply not a "wrongful lien."
ARGUMENT
I.

FOREST MEADOW CANNOT ESCAPE THE 1971 CC&Rs SINCE IT TOOK
TITLE TO LOT 105A WITH ACTUAL NOTICE OF THE 1971 CC&Rs AND
THE 1980 LIEN NOTICE.
It is undisputed that Forest Meadow took title to Lot 105A "[s]ubject to easements,

restrictions and rights of way appearing of record. . . ." (R. 00207-08). It also remains
undisputed that the 1971 CC&Rs and 1980 Lien Notice were recorded before Forest Meadow
took title to its lot and that Forest Meadow had actual notice of their content before purchase.
(R. 00167-68).10 Therefore, as a matter of law, the CC&Rs cannot be considered adverse to
10

The recordation of the CC&Rs imports constructive notice of their contents.
See Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-3-102, 57-4a-2 (2000).
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Forest Meadow's interest in Lot 105A since it acquired title expressly subject to the 1971
CC&Rs and 1980 Lien Notice. Moreover, the conduct of the prior owners, confirms Forest
Meadow's acceptance of and agreement to be bound to the 1971 CC&Rs and subsequent
1980 Lien Notice. (R. 00245).
CC&Rs act as a contract established by a prior owner that affects property and is
construed under principles of contract law:
Restrictive covenants that run with the land and encumber
subdivision lots form a contract between subdivision property
owners as a whole and individual lot owners; therefore,
interpretation of the covenants is governed by the same rules of
construction as those used to interpret contracts.
Swenson v. Erickson, 998 P.2d 807, 810-11 (Utah 2000) (citing 20 Am. Jur. 2D Covenants
§ 170 (1995)) (additional citations omitted) See also Holladay Duplex Management
Company, L.L.C., v. Howells, 47 P.3d 104, 105-106 (Utah App. 2002) (noting deeds and
restrictive covenants are interpreted in the same manner as contracts); Canyon Meadows
Home Owners Association v. Wasatch County, 40 P.3d 1148,1151 (Utah App. 2001) (same).
Therefore, Forest Meadow effectively became a party to that contract, i.e., the 1971 CC&Rs,
when it acquired title to Lot 105A subject to the restrictions and covenants recorded at that
time as indicated in the deed. (R. 00207-08). Forest Meadow cannot now complain about
the contract, the 1971 CC&Rs, since it took title with actual knowledge of their terms. (R.
00167-68). See 20 Am. Jur. 2D Covenants §§ 266-67 (1995) ("[restrictive covenants are
enforceable in equity against all those who take the estate with notice of them") (citations
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omitted); Swenson, 998 P.2d at 813 ("[restrictive covenant are a common method of
effectuating private residential developmental schemes [and] property owners who purchase
land in such developments have arightto enforce such covenants against other owners who
violate them").
It has long been the rule that equitable principles do not allow Forest Meadow to
avoid covenants and restrictions of which it had notice at the time of taking title:
Restrictive covenants are enforceable in equity against all
those who take the estate with notice of them, although they
may not be, strictly speaking, real covenants so as to run with
the land or of a nature to create a technical qualification of the
title conveyed by the deed. The question is not whether the
covenant runs with the land, but whether a party will be
permitted to use the land in a manner inconsistent with the
contract entered into by his or her vendor, where the purchase
was made with notice of such covenant. The enforcement of
restrictive covenants or equitable servitudes is based on the
principle of notice; that is, a person taking title to land with
notice of a restriction upon it will not, in equity and good
conscience, be permitted to violate such restriction.
***

Constructive or actual notice of a restrictive covenant imposed
in furtherance of a building or development scheme, on the
part of one against whom enforcement is sought, is essential.
Accordingly, restrictions on the use of land in a subdivision
embraced by a general plan of development can be enforced
against a subsequent purchaser who takes title to the land with
notice of the restriction.
***

A purchaser with notice of restrictive covenants upon land is
bound by such restrictions, although they are not such as in
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strict legal contemplation run with the land. Thus, even
though a covenant does not run with the land, it may be
enforceable against a transferee of the covenantor who takes
with knowledge of its terms under circumstances which would
make it inequitable to permit avoidance of the restriction.
Such a covenant is binding on a purchaser with notice not
merely because such purchaser stands as an assignee of the
party who made the agreement, but because he or she has
taken the estate with notice of a valid agreement concerning
it. The enforcement against a purchaser with notice rests
upon the principle that it would be inequitable to permit such
an owner, while enjoying the fruits of and claiming under the
grant, part of the consideration for which was the benefit
promised by the covenant, to destroy such benefit by violating
the covenant.
20 Am. Jur. 2D Covenants §§ 266-67 (1995) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Forest Meadow admits that it had actual notice of the 1971 CC&Rs and the 1980 Lien
Notice before it took title to Lot 105A. It therefore took title subject to these restrictions."
Forest Meadow cannot now escape compliance with the 1971 CC&Rs and their republication
in the 1980 Lien Notice. As a practical matter, the result of the 1971 CC&Rs being deemed
invalid by this newcomer's challenge would effectively cost the Association its ability to
assess its members to maintain the commonly owned property, maintain the road and water

1

'
The Association does not contest Forest Meadow's title to Lot 105 A. Nor does
the Association argue that the "subject to" language of the deeds somehow conveyed an
interest to Deseret Diversified at the time it recorded the 1971 CC&Rs. There are no
competing claims of title herein. Forest Meadow took title to its lot recognizing that some
other party "may have rights in the property' against which the grantor did not warrant title.'"
Ault v. Holden, 44 P.3d 781, 792 (Utah 2002) (quoting Johnson v. Peck, 63 P.2d 251, 254
(Utah 1936)). Indeed, "[tjhe words 'subject t o ' . . . commonly associated with attempts by
the grantors to give notice of encumbrances." Ault at 792 (quoting Hancock v. Planned Dev.
Corp., 791 P.2d 183, 186 (Utah 1990)) (emphasis added).
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systems, and fund its other activities (R. 00246-47). Such a decision would reverse a 30 year
history of providing such services and would be disastrously inequitable.
Moreover, Forest Meadow's argument that the 1971 CC&Rs are "invalid because they
were not 'subscribed' by Deseret Diversified after the property description was changed,"
App. Br. at 22-25, is not persuasive nor does it relieve Forest Meadow from being bound by
the 1971 CC&Rs of which it was on notice. As is clear from an examination of the 1971
CC&Rs, the refiling of the 1971 CC&Rs was made to correct a typographical error and
correct the property description (i.e., Township 1 North). (R. 00475-78). The re-filed 1971
CC&Rs were obviously corrective of the prior CC&Rs that contained an incorrect and
inapplicable township reference. To eliminate confusion, the 1971 CC&Rs were re-recorded
showing both the original and subsequent book and page references as well as with the prior
entry number and stamp. (R. 00475-78). Such correction was satisfactory for the Clerk of
Summit County, as her signature on the subsequently filed CC&Rs appears next to the
original recordation stamp. (R. 00475-78). The new description is presumed correct under
Utah Code Ann. § 57-4a-4 (1)0), as set forth more fully infra. Forest Meadow offered no
evidence to overcome that presumption. Indeed, Forest Meadow consistently understood and
assumed that the 1971 CC&Rs applied to this property - they were the very focus of this
petition and motion. Forest Meadow's effort to raise the re-recording was clearly an
afterthought, raised only after it had lost on summary judgment.
Forest Meadow also argues that the correction is invalid because it violates the Utah
Statute of Frauds, Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1 (2000). However, Forest Meadow offers no Utah
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authority to support its argument that the document had to be re-executed in order for it to be
effective. This was not a blank deed, nor was its import changed after it was signed. Rather,
the clear import of the re-recording is that the owner recognized its typographical error,
corrected it, and re-recorded the document to confirm that it applied to the property being
developed. The document, as re-recorded, satisfied all the requirements of the statute of
frauds and was properly accepted and filed by the Summit County Recorder. There is no
requirement that the signature be the last thing attached to a document, so long as the whole
reflects the author's intent.
Forest Meadow cites the rule provided in Arnold Industries, Inc., v. Love, 63 P.3d 721,
727-28 (Utah 2002), that states: "[A] mistake in the description of the land conveyed may be
corrected by a subsequent deed executed by the same grantor for the purpose of correcting the
description and confirming in the grantee the title to the land intended to have been described
in the prior deed." Id. (citing 23 Am. Jur. 2D Deeds § 333 (1983)). While the 1971 CC&Rs
are not a deed, Arnold does not stand for the proposition that a subsequent deed is the only
way to correct a legal description. In addition, the cited Am. Jur. 2D section continues (in the
2004 version), and is relevant to this determination: "[TJhe correction deed need not restate
all material portions of the deed being corrected if such portions contain no errors." 23 Am.
Jur. 2D Deeds § 272 (2004) (citing J.E. Golden v. C.E. Hayes, 277 So.2d 816, 817 (Fla. App.
1973)) (emphasis added).

The subsequently recorded CC&Rs meet the test set forth in

Arnold Industries since they contained the township correction and bear the recorder's stamps
on each page of the corrected and re-recorded 1971 CC&Rs. (R. 00475-78). They bear the
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owner's signature and apply to the land he developed. Moreover, Arnold instructs the Courts
to construe Deseret Diversified's action in re-recording the CC&Rs as its intention to correct
the scrivener's error contained in the CC&Rs as originally filed. See Arnold, 63 P.3d at 728
(noting "[w]e will not presume that the members intended to perform a useless act but will
construe the deed to give effect to the parties' intentions" (citing 16A C.J.S. Deeds § 170
(2001))). No other reasonable conclusion about the re-recording of the CC&Rs can be
reached.
In J.E. Golden, relied upon by the court in Arnold, the court was faced with a similar
problem as is presented by the filing of the corrective 1971 CC&Rs. In that case, the court
addressed the validity of a corrective deed to correct errors in a previous deed relating to oil
and mineral rights. Id. The court's ruling is instructive:
A deed containing an incorrect description or a misspelling of
names may be corrected by a subsequent instrument clearly
identified as a correction deed. Said deed need not restate all
material portions of the deed being corrected if such portions
contain no errors. . . . In the present case, the July 12, 1954
correction deed clearly and unequivocally relates to and
identifies the June 23, 1954 deed and both deeds are recorded.
The correction deed of July 12th was placed on record before
anyone else's rights intervened and both deeds were record
notice to subsequent purchasers. Appellants, as well as all other
subsequent grantees, had clear notice of appellee's reservation
of oil and mineral rights by virtue of the direct reference in the
July 12th correction deed to the June 23rd instrument it was
correcting. Thus, appellants' points on appeal concerning
reformation of deeds when the rights of subsequent bona fide
purchasers for value have intervened and estoppel are without
merit.
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Id. at 817 (citations omitted). Here, the original CC&Rs contained an incorrect property
description. (R. 0023-26). The corrected CC&Rs "clearly and unequivocally" relate to the
prior CC&Rs, page by page as demonstrated by the clerk's stamps, filed mere days before
(R. 00475-78). While not called a "corrective" instrument, it is obvious that the subsequent
filing corrected entry 113593, as the correction was made to the originally filed CC&Rs with
all of the clerk's stamps of the prior filing present on the corrective instrument. (R. 0047578). Like the parties in J.E. Golden, the corrected 1971 CC&Rs were promptly recorded
before "anyone else's rights intervened" and certainly long before Forest Meadow took title.
It remains undisputed that Forest Meadow took title with actual knowledge of the CC&Rs.
(R. 00167-68). Here, there is no indication of fraud or otherwise; the incorrect property
description was clearly a typographical error and was quickly corrected with the full
knowledge of the Summit County clerk. See e.g., Sartain v. Fidelity Financial Services, Inc.,
775 P.2d 161, 164 (Idaho App. 1989) (noting "[wjhere there is no fraud and the rights of
third persons have not intervened, and equity could have reformed the deed, it may be
amended by a subsequent instrument so as to effectuate the intention of the parties")
(citations omitted).
In effect, Forest Meadow wants to invalidate the CC&Rs that have been adhered to
by hundreds of property owners based on a contemporaneously corrected scrivener's error.
Forest Meadow was not confused by the error - it understood and argued that the CC&Rs
applied to its lot. Accordingly, equity does not allow for this result. See, e.g., Gonzales v.
Gonzales, 867 P.2d 1220,1228 (N.M. App. 1993) (noting that equitable principles may apply
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relating to a corrective deed based upon the parties' conduct). Forest Meadow's request to
invalidate the 1971 CC&Rs is an extravagant and wasteful effort to lift form over substance.
The result it seeks is inconsistent with the law and equity and should be rejected.
II.

FOREST MEADOW DID NOT OVERCOME THE PRESUMPTION THAT
DESERET DIVERSIFIED WAS THE OWNER AND DEVELOPER OF WHAT
BECAME LOT 105A AT THE TIME THE 1971 CC&Rs WERE RECORDED.
Utah law includes a specific statutory presumption among many that "recitals and

other statements of fact in a [recorded] document... are true." Utah Code Ann. § 57-4a4(1 )(j) (2000).n A recital by definition is "[a] preliminary statement in a contract or deed
explaining the background of the transaction or showing the existence of particular facts."
Black's Law Dictionary 1276 (7th ed. 1999). When recitals and other statements of fact are
included in a recorded document, the presumption of their truth "may only be overcome by
clear and convincing evidence." Jacobs v. Hafen, 875 P.2d 559, 561 (Utah App. 1994)
(concerning the presumption in section 57-4a-4 (l)(j) that delivery of a deed occurred
notwithstanding any lapse of time between the date on the document and the date of
recording).
Lot 105 A was created by the recorded plat map that established Plat D of the Forest
Meadow Ranch subdivision. (R. 00135). Forest Meadow Ranch Plat D, which was recorded
with the Summit County Recorder on May 6, 1976, clearly recites that the "owners" of the

Despite being fully briefed at the district court level, Forest Meadow
consistently ignores the application of this statutory provision and offers no evidence to
overcome the presumption.
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property were Deseret Diversified and Security Title. The Owners' Declaration indicates,
in relevant part:
Know all men by these presents that we, the four undersigned
owners of the above described tract of land, having caused the
same to be subdivided into lots & streets hereafter to be known
as: FOREST MEADOW RANCH, PLAT "D" do hereby
dedicate for perpetual use of the public all parcels of land shown
on this plat as intended for public use.
(R. 00135). The plat was then signed by Deseret Diversified (by W. Brent Jensen, President,
and Lee Ann Hunter, Secretary) and by Security Title Company as Trustee, as owners. (R.
00135).

The Subdivider's Note, also contained on the recorded Plat D, provides additional
evidence that Deseret Diversified was the beneficial owner of the property being subdivided.
The note reads:
The recording of this plat shall not constitute a dedication of the
roads and streets or rights of way to public use. It is intended
that all streets shown hereon shall remain the property of the
subdivider, Deseret Diversified Development, Inc.—and shall
be completely maintained by said owners.
(R. 00135). The Surveyor's Certificate provides additional evidence and proof that Deseret
Diversified was an owner at the time Plat D was recorded. This certification provides, in
relevant part, "I, Lynn D. Gottfredsen, do hereby certify... that I have, by authority of the
owners, subdivided the tract of land shown on this plat & described below into lots & streets
(private roads), to hereafter known as FOREST Meadow RANCH, PLAT 'D.'" (R. 00135).
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Security Title, as Trustee, by its signature clearly agreed with and ratified the recital of
Deseret Diversified's ownership interest.
Forest Meadow provided no evidence to rebut the presumption, pursuant to section
57-4a-4(i)(j), that Security Title, held legal title as a "Trustee" on behalf of its principal. Plat
D and the 1971 CC&Rs confirm that the principal, the beneficial title holder, was Deseret
Diversified, the party that signed and recorded the 1971 CC&Rs. (R. 00135). Utah Law is
clear to the effect that:
There is a significant difference between the type of bare legal
title possessed by an agent or trustee and the beneficial
interest. . . . Agents and trustees have no direct beneficial
interest in the property to which they hold title. Their title is
held purely for the benefit of another.
Capital Assets Financial Services v. Maxwell, 994 P.2d 201, 205 (Utah 2000).13
The 1971 CC&Rs also recite that Deseret Diversified was the owner of "the South
half of Section 22, Township 1 North, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, which
will consist of all the lots of the Forest Meadow Ranch subdivisions within this area," (R.
00475-78), a portion of which ultimately became Lot 105A. The 1971 CC&Rs were signed
1

Forest Meadow also argues that the 1971 CC&Rs are invalid under the Utah
general law of trusts as "the beneficiary of a trust does not have the power to encumber
specific properties held by the trustee in trust." Forest Meadow offers no legal authority
from Utah to support its argument and ignores the law illustrated in Capital Assets, supra.
Clearly, Security Title "purely" held title "for the benefit of another." 944 P.2d at 205.
Forest Meadow's litany of hypotheticals, App. Br. at 38-43, ignores the reality that Deseret
Diversified was the property owner and Security Title acted as trustee in holding the title for
Deseret Diversified. None of the "parade of horribles" suggested by Forest Meadow is
supported by a determination that Deseret Diversified, as an owner of the property, had the
authority to record the CC&Rs or that the CC&Rs remain valid today.
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by W. Brent Jensen, as President of Deseret Diversified. Id. By statutory presumption, this
statement in the recorded 1971 CC&Rs establishes that Deseret Development had an
ownership interest in the property at the time the 1997 CC&Rs were recorded. See Utah
Code Ann. § 57-4a-4(l)(j) (2000). No contrary evidence was offered.
Yet additional evidence supports that fact that Deseret Development was the
beneficial owner of the property at the time the CC&Rs were recorded. It has long been
common knowledge and reputation in the Pine Meadow area that Brent Jensen and his
companies, including Deseret Diversified, were the developers of Pine Meadow and Forest
Meadow subdivisions. (R. 00244). Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court described Jensen and
his companies as the developers of the Pine Meadow and Forest Meadow subdivisions. See
Leo M. Bertanole, Inc. 639 P.2d at 212 (noting that in 1970 "Brent Jensen, a defendant,
bought acreage north of Tollgate Canyon for development purposes

By January 1,1975,

380 mountain lots had been sold in areas served by Tollgate Road, including Jensen's Forest
Meadow Ranch and Pine Meadow Ranch subdivisions"). Though the interest of Deseret
Diversified in the property may not have appeared of record before the 1971 CC&Rs and Plat
D the world was put on notice of its interest when those documents were recorded. See Utah
Code Ann. §§ 57-3-102, 57-4a-2 (2000). And, all who acquired lots created by Deseret
Diversified's Plat D took title to those lots by virtue of its actions as owner and subdivider.
There is simply no evidence to overcome the presumption that the beneficial owner
of the property that ultimately became Lot 105 A at the time the 1971 CC&Rs were recorded
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was Deseret Diversified. Consistently, all indications and practical considerations confirm
that it was and, acted as, an owner of the property. Accordingly, as owner, Deseret
Diversified had full authority to burden its lands and record the 1971 CC&Rs to create
constructive notice of their content.
A.

Forest Meadow's Assertion that Security Title Owned the Property that
Became Lot 105A Outright Under the Doctrine of Descriptio Personae is
Incorrect Because "Other Circumstances Suggesting the Creation or Existence
of a Trust" are Present.

Forest Meadow incorrectly asserts that the term "trustee" in the original Bates' deed
to Security Title, (R. 00172), was merely descriptio personae and therefore insufficient to
form a trust on behalf of Deseret Diversified. Therefore, Forest Meadow's argument
follows, since no trust existed, Deseret Diversified did not have the authority necessary to
record the 1971 CC&Rs since Security Title was the actual owner of the property. To the
contrary, "agents and trustees have no direct beneficial interest in the property to which they
hold title." Capital Assets, 994 P.2d at 205.
Forest Meadow asserts that this case is similar to TWN, Inc., v. Michel, 66 P.3d 1031
(Utah App. 2003). See App. Br. at 26. In TWN, the parties asserted competing claims to
ownership of a parcel that was passed to one party's predecessor in interest by "Richard A.
Christenson, Trustee" and the other parcel passed to the other party's predecessor in interest
by "Richard A. Christenson." Id. at 1032. The issue in TWN was whether a grantor's
unexplained placing of the word "trustee" next to his name on a real property deed results,
as a matter of law, in conveyance of only a trust interest. The court noted that the doctrine
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of descriptio personae applied when "certain terms [are] sometimes added to a person's
name [that] are merely descriptive matter intended to clarify the identity of the person, but
their use or non-use should generally play no part in the validity of the conveyance." Id. at
1033. The concept of descriptio personae "has long been recognized" to apply "to the
identification of parties on real property deeds. Id. at 1034 (citations omitted). Therefore,
the court held, "[t]he unexplained use of the word 'trustee' on a real property deed does not,
absent other circumstances suggesting the creation or existence of a trust, create a trust or
implicate only a trust interest." Id (emphasis added). The court also noted that Utah Code
Ann. § 75-7-402(5) authorizes a trustee to dispose of trust property "in the name of the trust
as trustee." TWN at 1035 (citing U.C.A. § 75-7-402(5) (1993)). Typically, the court noted,
"[a] trustee grantor should include on the deed such language as 'in my capacity as trustee
for the XYZ trust' [but] a party may resort to extrinsic evidence to show that a trust was, in
fact, intended." Id. (emphasis added).
Forest Meadow argues that "[t]he burden is on [the Association] to present sufficient
extrinsic evidence that a reasonable person could conclude that a trust actually existed for the
benefit of Deseret Diversified." App. Br. at 27. That is simply not the case. There are no
competing claims to Lot 105 A. Forest Meadow owns it. Even if the Association has such
a burden, however, the overwhelming extrinsic evidence, as the trial court correctly
determined in its March 22,2004, Ruling and Order, shows that the beneficial owner of the
property was Deseret Diversified and that Security Title acted as trustee for the owner:
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Here, there is no competing title interests in property. There is no
dispute that [Forest Meadow] is the record title holder to the
property. It is undisputed that [Forest Meadow's] title traces back
to Security Title. It is undisputed that Security Title's name is on
the deed as trustee. However, here, other circumstances exists
that did not exist in TWN. Specifically, the name of the trustee,
Security Title, was one that would generally be seen as a trustee,
not a property owner. A title company often holds title to property
as trustee. Furthermore, the recorded plat map reflected Deseret
[Diversified] as the owner of the property and Security Title as
trustee. The recorded plat map clearly reflects Security Title as
the trustee of the property and Deseret [Diversified] as owners of
the property. Moreover, it is undisputed that Deseret had recorded
CC&Rs with protective covenants and listed Desert as owner of
the land. The court concludes that the word "trustee" under the
circumstances surrounding this case reflected the existence of a
trust and that Deseret [Diversified] was the beneficiary and owner
of the property.
(R. 00378-79). There is ample evidence to confirm that lands were held in trust for the
benefit of interests that later devolved to Deseret Diversified. The word "trustee" as used
in these instruments obviously did not describe Security Title; rather, it described and limited
the interest held by that entity. See, Neeley v. Intercity Mgmt. Corp., 623 S.W.2d 942, 948
(Tex.App. 1981) (cited in TWN and holding that a trust was created where there were
multiple extraneous factors suggesting its creation, not simply the word "trustee" in the
deed).

Here, the doctrine of descriptio personae, as argued by Forest Meadow, is

inapplicable.
B.

The 1971 CC&Rs are Valid Since Desert Diversified was in Privity with the
Property that Became Lot 105A.

Forest Meadow incorrectly argues that Deseret Diversified could not have recorded
the 1971 CC&Rs because it had no estate in the property that became Lot 105A since
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Security Title owned the land in fee simple. See App. Br. at 32. Security Title did not hold
title in fee simple, however, and Deseret Diversified was clearly in privity of estate and could
record CC&Rs relating to what would become Lot 105 A.
Restrictive covenants, like the 1971 CC&Rs, that run with the land must have the
following characteristics: "(1) the covenant must touch and concern the land; (2) the
covenanting parties must intend the covenant to run with the land; and (3) there must be
privity of estate." Flying Diamond Oil Corporation v. Newton Sheep Company, 776 P.2d
618, 622-23 (Utah 1989).
The first requirement requires that it "touch and concern the land." "For a covenant
to run in equity, it must 'touch and concern' the land, and there must be an intent that it run.
Privity is not required, but the successor must have notice of the covenant." Id. at 623, n. 6.
The Flying Diamond further court notes:
Not every covenant binds subsequent owners or users of the
land, even though the covenant purports to be a covenant that
runs with the land. The effect of the touch-and-concern
requirement is to restrict the types of duties and liabilities that
can burden future ownership of interests in the land. The touchand-concern requirement focuses on the nature of the burdens
and benefits that a covenant creates. What is essential is that the
burdens and benefits created must relate to the land and the
ownership of an interest in it; the burdens and benefits created
are not the personal duties or rights of the parties to a covenant
that exist independently from the ownership of an interest in the
land (citations omitted).
***

[T]o touch and concern the land, a covenant must bear upon the
use and enjoyment of the land and be of the kind that the owner
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of an estate or interest in land may make because of ownership
right.
Id. at 623-24 (citations omitted). The second characteristic requires that the parties intended
the covenant to run with the land. The parities' intent may be determined by an express
statement in the document or implied by the nature of the covenant itself. Id. at 627. The
1971 CC&Rs expressly meet these requirements.
The final characteristic is that of privity of estate. "Privity of estate requires a
particular kind of relationship between the original covenantor and the covenantee." Id. at
628 (citations omitted). There are three types of privity of estate:
(1) mutual, i.e., a covenant arising from simultaneous interest in
the same land; (2) horizontal, i.e., a covenant created in
connection with a conveyance of an estate from one of the
parties to another; and (3) vertical, i.e., the devolution of an
estate burdened or benefitted by a covenant from an original
covenanting party to a successor.
***

Mutual privity exists when the parties have a continuing and
simultaneous interest in the same property (citations omitted).
Horizontal privity exists when the original covenanting parties
create a covenant in connection with a simultaneous conveyance
of an estate (citations omitted). Vertical privity arises when the
person presently claiming the benefit, or being subjected to the
burden is a successor to the estate of the original person so
benefitted or burdened. Vertical privity exists in all covenant
situations except where a successor to the burdened or
benefitted land is an adverse possessor or a disseisor.
Id. (citations omitted). Flying Diamond declares that the "strict approach to privity doctrine
[should be abandoned] and . . . substance should prevail over technical form so that a
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homeowner's association which had no interest in the property at all could sue to enforce a
covenant." Id. at 628, n. 13 (citations omitted).
When the substance of the case is examined, it clearly appears that there was vertical
privity of estate: here Security Title acted as Trustee for the interests that were ultimately held
by Deseret Diversified. (R. 0135). Security Title, a business that, by statute and function held
and transferred land titles, acquired this property in the states capacity of trustee for
then-undisclosed interests. The beneficial interest of Deseret Diversified ultimately was
reflected of record when it recorded the 1971 CC&Rs reciting its ownership of the property
that subsequently became Lot 105A. (R. 0135). Security Title ratified and confirmed that
interest when it executed the Plat with Deseret Diversified as "owners." Forest Meadow's
successors-in-interest received title from Security Title as Trustee for Deseret Diversified.
(R. 0135).
The 1971 CC&Rs expressly state that "the reservations and restrictive covenants herein
set out are to run with the land and shall be binding upon all persons owning or occupying any
lot

" (R. 00475-78). The neighboring Pine Meadow CC&Rs similarly expressly provided

that "all of the properties . . . . shall be held, sold and conveyed subject to the following
easements, restrictions, covenants, and conditions, which are for the purpose of protecting the
value and desirability of, which shall run with, the real property." (R. 00181-90). Under
Flying Diamond, the CC&Rs clearly run with the land and Forest Meadow is bound by them.
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The chain of title is clear, and as the trial court ruled in its March 22,2004, Ruling and Order,
Forest Meadow's "title is burdened by the prior recorded covenants." (R. 00379).I4
Additionally, in order for Forest Meadow to prevail on its argument that Deseret
Development lacks the privity requisite to record the 1971 CC&Rs, Forest Meadow must
overcome the statutory presumption of ownership created by the content of these documents
by clear and convincing evidence. See Jacobs, 875 P.2d at 561 (noting "the presumption [in
section 57-4a-4] may only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence"). Here, Forest
Meadow has not attempted to provide any such evidence.15

14

The trial court held, "even if there was no vertical privity, as a matter of equity,
the court agrees with [the Association] that prior predecessors in interest have treated the
covenants as covenants that run with the land and so must [Forest Meadow]. A challenge
to these covenants over thirty years later is untimely and must be barred." (R. 00380).
Clearly, in Utah, a party must prevail in claims on the strength of his own title and not on the
weakness of another. See, e.g., Kelly v. Hard Money Funding, Inc., 87 P.3d 734, 790 (Utah
App. 2004) (noting rule that "to succeed in an action to quiet title to real estate, a plaintiff
must prevail on the strength of his own claim to title and not on the weakness of a
defendant's title or even its total lack of title"); Collard v. Nagle Const., Inc., 57 P.3d 603,
607 (Utah App. 2002) (same); Church v. Meadow Springs Ranch Corporation, Inc., 659 P.2d
1045, 1048-49 (Utah 1983) (same).
15

Forest Meadow suggests that Dunlap v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds,
76 P.3d 711 (Utah App. 2003), cert, den., 84 P.3d 239 (Utah 2004), is supportive of its
position. See App. Br. at 38. Forest Meadow's reliance on Dunlap is misplaced. The issue
in Dunlap involved determining ownership between completing chains of title. Here, there
is no dispute as to title regarding Lot 105A. The Association does not claim to be the owner
of Lot 105 A through a competing chain of title nor does it contest that Forest Meadow is the
rightful owner. Dunlap and similar cases focus on the problems created when documents
affecting title are not recorded. Dunlap does not support the position that the content of a
recorded document such as CC&Rs, recorded may be ignored, especially when the party has
actual notice of the recorded document and its content.
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III.

UTAH HAS NOT ADOPTED THE DOCTRINE OF UNIFORMITY AND IT IS
UNNECESSARY TO DO SO AS THE CC&Rs ARE UNIFORM IN THE
RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED.
Forest Meadow argues that the 1971 CC&Rs are unenforceable under the "Utah

Doctrine of Uniformity" since they cover only a minority of the lots in Forest Meadow Ranch
Plat D. See App. Br. at 43-44.
Forest Meadow cites no authority at all for its argument that the Utah legislature or
courts have adopted the doctrine of uniformity. Moreover, even assuming that the doctrine
of uniformity applies, the CC&Rs are uniform as applied to each lot or home owner. Forest
Meadow complains that the 1971 CC&Rs do not apply to all of the land owners in Plat D.
There is no requirement that they do so. Under the doctrine of uniformity, as described by
Forest Meadow, the CC&Rs must be uniform in their application to those land owners to
whom the CC&Rs apply. See 20 Am. Jur. 2D Covenants § 160 (1995) ("Restrictive covenants
in deed will not be enforced at the instance of other property owners unless there is
reasonable uniformity in the restrictions imposed....") (emphasis). That requirement is met
here: the restrictions in the 1971 CC&Rs apply uniformly to all lands that are subject to them.
On a broader scale, the uncontroverted evidence before the trial court shows that the
Association's assessments are uniform throughout the various Pine Meadow and Forest
Meadow Subdivisions. Accordingly, this technical argument also fails.
IV.

THE 1980 LIEN NOTICE IS NOT A WRONGFUL LIEN AS IT MERELY
REPUBLISHED THE 1971 CC&Rs AND THE PINE MEADOW CC&Rs.
Forest Meadow argues that the 1980 Lien Notice is a wrongful lien pursuant to Utah

Code Ann. §§ 38-9-1, etseq. (2000). Section 3 8-9-1(6) of the Utah Code provides that a lien
42

is wrongful if it "purports to create a lien or encumbrance on an owner's interest in certain
real property and at the time it is recorded or filed is not: . . . (c) signed by or authorized
pursuant to a document signed by the owner of the real property." Utah Code Ann. § 38-91(6) (2000). As a threshold issue, Forest Meadow was not an "owner" of Lot 105 A at the
time the 1980 Lien Notice was filed. (R. 00207-08). In fact, Forest Meadow did not become
a record owner of Lot 105 A for nearly two decades after the 1980 Lien Notice was recorded.
(R. 0136). Therefore, Forest Meadow did not have "an owner's interest in certain real
property" "at the time [the 1980 Lien Notice] [was] recorded." By the unambiguous terms
and clear meaning of the statute, it is untimely and inappropriate for Forest Meadow, over
twenty years later, to consume the lesources of the Association and the court complaining of
the lien and seeking declaration that the lien is "wrongful." It has no such standing. The
predecessors in title to Lot 105 A, who had title in 1980, may have had standing to petition the
court for removal of the lien as wrongful, but no application was made.
It would be decidedly inequitable, and contrary to the purpose of the Wrongful Lien
Statute, to allow Forest Meadow to look backwards and challenge an encumbrance created
decades before it took title with notice of the encumbrance. Again, Forest Meadow took title
with actual notice of both of the 1971 CC&Rs and the 1980 Lien Notice. (R. 00167-68). It
made the knowing choice to buy the lot burdened by those encumbrances and cannot now
complain about them. In addition, the 1980 Lien Notice, both by its terms and as clarified by
the 2003 clarification of notice of lien, does not create any new obligation and cannot be
considered a wrongful lien. Rather, the 1980 Lien Notice merely restates and republishes the
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obligations established and placed of record by various CC&Rs as they apply to the lots and
subdivisions described therein.
Moreover, the question of whether the 1980 Lien Notice goes beyond the reach of the
1971 CC&Rs with regard to Lot 105A is not ripe for determination. The Association has
never attempted to collect assessments from Forest Meadow by lien foreclosure. (R. 00469).
Yet, Forest Meadow and its predecessors-in-interest have enjoyed all benefits of the
Association membership, including use of open space, roads and road maintenance, and
voting rights. The trial court's Ruling and Order, dated March 22,2004, reiterates this point:
[WJhere [Forest Meadow] bought the land with notice it did so
subject to certain restrictions, [Forest Meadow] ought to be
bound by those restrictions. Prior to subdividing the property
Deseret [Diversified] recorded the plats and CC&Rs. The initial
transfer from Security Title was granted in 1975. This was
several years after the plats and CC&Rs were recorded. [Forest
Meadow's] predecessors in interest paid the assessments and
enjoyed the roads and open spaces as a result thereof. [Forest
Meadow] has also had the right to enjoy the roads and open
spaces. There is no dispute that [Forest Meadow] had notice of
the restrictions at the time it received the property. Moreover,
[Forest Meadow] took the property "[s]ubject to easements,
restrictions and rights of way appearing of record. . . ." For
[Forest Meadow] now to claim that those restrictions should not
apply to it is not persuasive. The restrictions were recorded long
before [Forest Meadow] obtained title. It would be inequitable
to permit [Forest Meadow], while enjoying the fruits of such
restrictions, to not comply with the restrictions when [Forest
Meadow] had notice of them at the time it obtained title.
(R. 00380-81). By virtue of the plain language of the statute, and also based on principles
of equity, the 1980 Lien Notice was not and is not wrongful.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated in this Brief, the Judgment entered by the Court on behalf of
the Association is amply supported in law and in equity. This Court should, therefore, reject
Forest Meadow's technical arguments and affirm the District Court's judgment.
Respectfully submitted this 22nd day of October 2004.
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON

hJ<//b^~,
Edwin C. Barnes
Walter A. Romney, Jr.
Attorneys for Respondent /Appellee
Pine Meadow Ranch Home Owners Association
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ADDENDUM
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UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 57. REAL ESTATE
CHAPTER 3. RECORDING OF DOCUMENTS
PART 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS
Copyright • 1953-2000 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. one of the LEXIS
Publishing companies. All rights reserved.
57-3-102 Record imparts notice --Change in interest rate --Validity of document --Notice
of unnamed interests --Conveyance by grantee [Effective until July 1, 2001] .
(1) Each document executed, acknowledged, and certified, in the manner prescribed by
this title, each original document or certified copy of a document complying with Section
57-4a-3, whether or not acknowledged, each copy of a notice of location complying with
Section 40-1-4, and each financing statement complying with Section 70A-9-402, whether or
not acknowledged shall, from the time of recording with the appropriate county recorder,
impart notice to all persons of their contents.
(2) If a recorded document was given as security, a change in the interest rate in
accordance with the terms of an agreement pertaining to the underlying secured obligation
does not affect the notice or alter the priority of the document provided under Subsection
(1) .
(3) This section does not affect the validity of a document with respect to the parties
to the document and all other persons who have notice of the document.
(4) The fact that a recorded document recites only a nominal consideration, names the
grantee as trustee, or otherwise purports to be in trust without naming beneficiaries or
stating the terms of the trust does not charge any third person with notice of any
interest of the grantor or of the interest of any other person not named in the document.
(5) The grantee in a recorded document may convey the interest granted to him free and
clear of all claims not disclosed in the document in which he appears as grantee or in any
other document recorded in accordance with this title that sets forth the names of the
beneficiaries, specifies the interest claimed, and describes the real property subject to
the interest.
U.C.A. 1953 § 57-3-102
UT ST § 57-3-102
END OF DOCUMENT
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UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 57. REAL ESTATE
CHAPTER 4a. EFFECTS OF RECORDING
Copyright ® 1953-2000 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. one of the LEXIS
Publishing companies. All rights reserved.
57-4a-2

Recorded document imparts notice of contents despite defects.

A recorded document imparts notice of its contents regardless of any defect,
irregularity, or omission in its execution, attestation, or acknowledgment. A certified
copy of a recorded document is admissible as evidence to the same extent the original
document would be admissible as evidence.
History: C. 1953, 57-4a-2, enacted by L. 1988, ch. 155, § 20.
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Effect on existing documents.
When this section took effect on July 1, 1988, it operated to cure any existing
defective recorded document. First Sec. Bank v. Styler, 147 Bankr. 248 (D. Utah 1992).
This section does not say that a defective document is valid only if recorded after July
1, 1988. First Sec. Bank v. Styler, 147 Bankr. 248 (D. Utah 1992).
Section 68-3-3, prohibiting retroactive effect unless expressly declared, has no
application to the operation of this section. This section cured existing defective
recorded documents when it took effect; it did not retroactively cure any defective
instruments. First Sec. Bank v. Styler, 147 Bankr. 248 (D. Utah 1992).
U.C.A. 1953 § 57-4a-2
UT ST § 57-4a-2
END OF DOCUMENT

Copr. © 2004 West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 57. REAL ESTATE
CHAPTER 4a. EFFECTS OF RECORDING
Copyright ® 1953-2000 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. one of the LEXIS
Publishing companies. All rights reserved.
57-4a-4

Presumptions.

(1) A recorded document creates the following presumptions regarding title to the real
property affected:
(a) the document is genuine and was executed voluntarily by the person purporting to
execute it;
(b) the person executing the document and the person on whose behalf it is executed
are the persons they purport to be;
(c) the person executing the document was neither incompetent nor a minor at any
relevant time;
(d) delivery occurred notwithstanding any lapse of time between dates on the document
and the date of recording;
(e) any necessary consideration was given;
(f) the grantee, transferee, or beneficiary of an interest created or described by the
document acted in good faith at all relevant times;
(g) a person executing a document as an agent, attorney in fact, officer of an
organization, or in a fiduciary or official capacity:
(i) held the position he purported to hold and acted within the scope of his authority;
(ii) in the case of an officer of an organization, was authorized under all applicable
laws to act on behalf of the organization,- and
(iii) in the case of an agent, his agency was not revoked, and he acted for a principal
who was neither incompetent nor a minor at any relevant time;
(h) a person executing the document as an individual:
(i) was unmarried on the effective date of the document; or
(ii) if it otherwise appears from the document that the person was married on the
effective date of the document, the grantee was a bona fide purchaser and the grantor
received adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth so that the joinder of

Copr. ® 2004 West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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UT ST § 57-4a-4
U.C.A. 1953 § 57-4a-4
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the nonexecuting spouse was not required under Sections 75-2-201 through 75-2-207;
(i) if the document purports to be executed pursuant to or to be a final determination
in a judicial or administrative proceeding, or to be executed pursuant to a power of
eminent domain, the court, official body, or condemnor acted within its jurisdiction and
all steps required for the execution of the document were taken; and
(j) recitals and other statements of fact in a document, including without limitation
recitals concerning mergers or name changes of organizations, are true.
(2) The presumptions stated in Subsection (1) arise even though the document purports
only to release a claim or to convey any right, title, or interest of the person executing
it or the person on whose behalf it is executed.
History: C. 1953, 57-4a-4, enacted by L. 1988, ch. 155, § 22; 1989, ch. 88, § 11.
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Evidence to overcome presumption.
Cited.
Evidence to overcome presumption.
The presumption of valid delivery when a deed has been executed and recorded may be
overcome only by clear and convincing evidence that the deed was in fact not delivered.
Jacobs v. Hafen, 875 P.2d 559 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
Cited in Reinbold v. Utah Fun Shares, 850 P.2d 487 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
U.C.A. 1953 § 57-4a-4
UT ST § 57-4a-4
END OF DOCUMENT
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UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 36. LIENS
CHAPTER 9. WRONGFUL LIEN
Copyright ® 1953-2000 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. one of the LEXIS
Publishing companies. All rights reserved.
38-9-1

Definitions.

As used in this chapter:
(1) "Interest holder" means a person who holds or possesses a present, lawful property
interest in certain real property, including an owner, title holder, mortgagee, trustee,
or beneficial owner.
(2) "Lien claimant" means a person claiming an interest in real property who offers a
document for recording or filing with any county recorder in the state asserting a lien or
other claim of interest in certain real property.
(3) "Owner" means a person who has a vested ownership interest in certain real
property.
(4) "Record interest holder" means a person who holds or possesses a present, lawful
property interest in certain real property, including an owner, titleholder, mortgagee,
trustee, or beneficial owner, and whose name and interest in that real property appears in
the county recorder's records for the county in which the property is located.
(5) "Record owner" means an owner whose name and ownership interest in certain real
property is recorded or filed in the county recorder's records for the county in which the
property is located.
(6) "Wrongful lien" means any document that purports to create a lien or encumbrance
on an owner's interest in certain real property and at the time it is recorded or filed is
not:
(a) expressly authorized by this chapter or another state or federal statute;
(b) authorized by or contained in an order or judgment of a court of competent
jurisdiction in the state; or
(c) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed by the owner of the real
property.
History. C. 1953, 38-9-1, enacted by L. 1997, ch. 125, § 2.
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS
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Repeals and Reenactments. --Laws 1997, ch. 125, § 2, repeals former § 38-9-1, as enacted
by Laws 1985, ch. 182, § l, relating to the liability of a person filing a wrongful lien,
and enacts the present section. See §§ 38-9-4 and 38-9-5 for present liability
provisions.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Wrongful lien.
A notice of termination of restrictive covenants recorded in the office of the county
recorder was not a wrongful lien. Swenson v. Erickson, 2000 TJT 16, 998 P.2d 807.
Plaintiffs were entitled to summary relief where the parties' sales agreement did not
convey defendants an interest in property, but only a qualified promise to do so at a
later time, and therefore defendants* notice of interest was a wrongful lien as defined in
this section. Russell v. Thomas, 2000 UT App 82, 999 P.2d 1244.
U.C.A. 1953 § 38-9-1
UT ST § 38-9-1
END OF DOCUMENT
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38-9-2

Scope.

(1) (a) The provisions of Sections 38-9-1, 38-9-3, 38-9-4, 38-9- 5, and 38-9-6 apply to
any recording or filing or any rejected recording or filing of a lien pursuant to this
chapter on or after May 5, 1997.
(b) The provisions of Sections 38-9-1 and 38-9-7 apply to all liens of record
regardless of the date the lien was recorded or filed.
(2) The provisions of this chapter shall not prevent a person from filing a lis pendens
in accordance with Section 78-40-2 or seeking any other relief permitted by law.
(3) This chapter does not apply to a person entitled to a lien under
files a lien pursuant to Title 38, Chapter l, Mechanics' Liens.

Section 38-1-3 who

History: C. 1953, 38-9-2, enacted by L. 1997, ch. 125, § 3; 1999, ch. 122, § 1.
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS

Repeals and Reenactments. --Laws 1997, ch. 125, § 3 repeals former § 38-9-2, as enacted
by Laws 1985, ch. 182, § 2, relating to an unauthorized lien as invalid, and enacts the
present section. For present comparable provision, see § 38-9-7.
Amendment Notes. --The 1999 amendment, effective May 3, 1999, added the Subsection
(1)(a) designation; substituted the list of sections in Subsection (1)(a) for "this
chapter"; added Subsection (1)(b); and added "Mechanics' Liens" in Subsection (3).
U.C.A. 1953 § 38-9-2
UT ST § 38-9-2
END OF DOCUMENT
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38-9-3 County recorder may reject wrongful lien within scope of employment --Good faith
requirement.
(1) A county recorder may reject recording of a lien if the county recorder determines
the lien is a wrongful lien as defined in Section 38-9-1. If the county recorder rejects
the document, the county recorder shall immediately return the original document together
with a notice that the document was rejected pursuant to this section to the person
attempting to record or file the document or to the address provided on the document.
(2) A county recorder who, within the scope of the county recorder's employment, rejects
or accepts a document for recording or filing in good faith under this section may not be
liable for damages except as otherwise provided by law.
(3) If a rejected document is later found to be recordable pursuant to a court order, it
shall have no retroactive recording priority.
(4) Nothing in this chapter shall preclude any person from pursuing any remedy pursuant
to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 65A, Injunctions.
History: C. 1953, 38-9-3, enacted by L. 1997, ch. 125, § 4.
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS

Repeals and Reenactments. --Laws 1997, ch. 125, § 4 repeals former § 38-9-3, as enacted
by Laws 1985, ch. 182, § 3, relating to liability for refusing to correct a document
containing a wrongful lien, and enacts the present section.
Cross-References. --Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3- 204, 76-3-301.
County recorder, powers and duties, § 17-21-1 et seq.
U.C.A. 1953 § 38-9-3
UT ST § 38-9-3
END OF DOCUMENT
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38-9-4

Civil liability for filing wrongful lien --Damages.

(1) A lien claimant who records or files or causes a wrongful lien as defined in
Section 38-9-1 to be recorded or filed in the office of the county recorder against real
property is liable to a record interest holder for any actual damages proximately caused
by the wrongful lien.
(2) If the person in violation of this Subsection (1) refuses to release or correct the
wrongful lien within 20 days from the date of written request from a record interest
holder of the real property delivered personally or mailed to the last-known address of
the lien claimant, the person is liable to that record interest holder for $1,000 or for
treble actual damages, whichever is greater, and for reasonable attorney fees and costs.
(3) A person is liable to the record owner of real property for $3,000 or for treble
actual damages, whichever is greater, and for reasonable attorney fees and costs, who
records or files or causes to be recorded or filed a wrongful lien as defined in Section
38-9-1 in the office of the county recorder against the real property, knowing or having
reason to know that the document:
(a) is a wrongful lien;
(b) is groundless; or
(c) contains a material misstatement or false claim.
History: C. 1953, 38-9-4, enacted by L. 1997, ch. 125, § 5.
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS

Repeals and Reenactments. --Laws 1997, ch. 125, § 5 repeals former § 38-9-4, as enacted
by Laws 1985, ch. 182, § 6, relating to venue, costs, and attorney fees, and enacts the
present section. For present provisions, see § 38-9-6.
U.C.A. 1953 § 38-9-4
UT ST § 38-9-4
END OF DOCUMENT
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38-9-5

Criminal liability for filing a wrongful lien --Penalties.

(1) A person who intentionally records or files or causes to be recorded or filed a
wrongful lien with a county recorder is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. Under this
Subsection (1), it is an affirmative defense to this offense that the person recorded or
filed a release of the claim or lien within 20 days from the date of written request from
a record interest holder that the wrongful lien be released. The accused person shall
prove this affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence.
(2) A person who intentionally records or files or causes to be recorded or filed a
wrongful lien with the county recorder is guilty of a third degree felony if, at the time
of recording or filing, the person knowingly had no present, lawful property interest in
the real property and no reasonable basis to believe he had a present, lawful property
interest in the real property.
(3) Nothing in this section shall bar a prosecution for any act in violation of Section
76-8-414.
History: C. 1953, 38-9-5, enacted by L. 1997, ch. 125, § 6.
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS

Effective Dates. --Laws 1997, ch. 125 became effective on May 5, 1997, pursuant to Utah
Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.
Cross-References. --Sentencing for felonies, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-203,
Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301.
U.C.A. 1953 § 38-9-5
UT ST § 38-9-5
END OF DOCUMENT
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38-9-6 Petition to file lien --Notice to record interest holders --Summary relief
--Contested petition.
(l) A lien claimant whose document is rejected pursuant to Section 38-9-3 may petition
the district court in the county in which the document was rejected for an expedited
determination that the lien may be recorded or filed.
(2) (a) The petition shall be filed with the district court within ten days of the date
notice is received of the rejection and shall state with specificity the grounds why the
document should lawfully be recorded or filed.
(b) The petition shall be supported by a sworn affidavit of the lien claimant.
(c) If the court finds the petition is insufficient, it may dismiss the petition
without a hearing.
(d) If the court grants a hearing, the petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition,
notice of hearing, and a copy of the court's order granting an expedited hearing on all
record interest holders of the property sufficiently in advance of the hearing to enable
any record interest holder to attend the hearing and service shall be accomplished by
certified or registered mail.
(e) Any record interest holder of the property has the right to attend and contest the
petition.
(3) Following a hearing on the matter, if the court finds that the document may lawfully
be recorded, it shall issue an order directing the county recorder to accept the document
for recording. If the petition is contested, the court may award costs and reasonable
attorney's fees to the prevailing party.
(4) A summary proceeding under this section is only to determine whether or not a
contested document, on its face, shall be recorded by the county recorder. The proceeding
may not determine the truth of the content of the document nor the property or legal
rights of the parties beyond the necessary determination of whether or not the document
shall be recorded. The court's grant or denial of the petition under this section may not
restrict any other legal remedies of any party, including any right to injunctive relief
pursuant to Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 65A, Injunctions.
(5) If the petition contains a claim for damages, the damage proceedings may not be
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expedited under this section.
History: C. 1953, 38-9-6, enacted by L. 1997, ch. 125, § 7.
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS

Effective Dates. --Laws 1997, ch. 125 became effective on May 5, 1997, pursuant to Utah
Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.
U.C.A. 1953 § 38-9-6
UT ST § 38-9-6
END OF DOCUMENT
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38-9-7 Petition to nullify lien --Notice to lien claimant --Summary relief --Finding of
wrongful lien --Wrongful lien is void.
(1) Any record interest holder of real property against which a wrongful lien as
defined in Section 38-9-1 has been recorded may petition the district court in the county
in which the document was recorded for summary relief to nullify the lien.
(2) The petition shall state with specificity the claim that the lien is a wrongful lien
and shall be supported by a sworn affidavit of the record interest holder.
(3) (a) If the court finds the petition insufficient, it may dismiss the petition
without a hearing.
(b) If the court finds the petition is sufficient, the court shall schedule a hearing
within ten days to determine whether the document is a wrongful lien.
(c) The record interest holder shall serve a copy of the petition on the lien claimant
and a notice of the hearing pursuant to Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 4, Process.
(d) The lien claimant is entitled to attend and contest the petition.
(4) A summary proceeding under this section is only to determine whether or not a
document is a wrongful lien. The proceeding shall not determine any other property or
legal rights of the parties nor restrict other legal remedies of any party.
(5) (a) Following a hearing on the matter, if the court determines that the document is
a wrongful lien, the court shall issue an order declaring the wrongful lien void ab
initio, releasing the property from the lien, and awarding costs and reasonable attorney's
fees to the petitioner.
(b) (i) The record interest holder may record a certified copy of the order with the
county recorder.
(ii) The order shall contain a legal description of the real property.
(c) If the court determines that the claim of lien is valid, the court shall dismiss
the petition and may award costs and reasonable attorney's fees to the lien claimant. The
dismissal order shall contain a legal description of the real property. The prevailing
lien claimant may record a certified copy of the dismissal order.
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(6) If the district court determines that the lien is a wrongful lien as defined in
Section 38-9-1, the wrongful lien is void ab initio and provides no notice of claim or
interest.
(7) If the petition contains a claim for damages, the damage proceedings may not be
expedited under this section.
History: C. 1953, 38-9-7, enacted by L. 1997, ch. 125, § 8.
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS

Effective Dates. --Laws 1997, ch. 125 became effective on May 5, 1997, pursuant to Utah
Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Future interest.
Plaintiffs were entitled to summary relief where the parties' sales agreement did not
convey defendants an interest in property, but only a qualified promise to do so at a
later time, and therefore defendants' filed notice of interest was a wrongful lien under §
38-9-1. Russell v. Thomas, 2000 UT App 82, 999 P.2d 1244.
U.C.A. 1953 § 38-9-7
UT ST § 38-9-7
END OF DOCUMENT
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